CA1: railroaded jailhouse lawyer can sue where he was railroaded to

Hannon v. Beard, No. 07-2272.  This is a piece of prisoner litigation.  But it is not an easy one.  Let’s see if we can lay out the figures.  Mr. Hannon (“the quintessential jailhouse lawyer”) was convicted of a crime in Pennsylvania, but was moved to Massachusetts (perhaps in retaliation for his lawyering).  In typical state-sponsored style, his legal materials “disappeared.”  In this lawsuit he sued some people in Pennsylvania (the Secretary of the Pennsylvania DOC and a librarian) as well.  Naturally, after he sued in Massachusetts, he was transferred again.  This guy does an awful lot of traveling.

Anyway, the District Court held that it didn’t have jurisdiction over the Pennsylvania defendants because, even though they sent him to Massachusetts, they didn’t transact business there.  So, it all comes down to the the Massachusetts long-arm statute, which is as wide as the constitution allows.  Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 223A, § 3(a)  (“[a] court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a person, who acts directly or by an agent, as to a cause of action in law or equity arising from the person’s transacting any business in this commonwealth.”).

The First sides with Hannon, and regarding the Secretary of Corrections, it writes:

The contacts that Beard would have had to make to arrange for Hannon’s transfer from Pennsylvania to Massachusetts are sufficient to constitute “transacting business” under the broadly-construed long-arm statute. The district court erred when it reasoned that because “[t]he decision to transfer plaintiff . . . occurred in Pennsylvania,” it lacked jurisdiction over Beard.

The First says that the contacts don’t have to be “commercial.” Likewise, the First rejects a whole bunch of badly made arguments by the state that somehow they were immune to a foreign state’s longarm statute because they were state officials. (In fact, there are actually, inapposite cases on this, but the First doesn’t cite them either. No matter.) Further, this doesn’t offend due process and this was a “purposeful availment.” The First rejects arguments that the Secretary wasn’t a party to the Interstate Compact, and notes that this isn’t a contract matter, anyway.  The First goes on to explain that because the plaintiff is alleging a constitutional injury – transferring him to avoid litigation – so it is damn obvious that the defendant would be sue where the prisoner was transferred to. And, in the end, it isn’t a hardship for the Secretary to defend the lawsuit in Massachusetts, especially when Massachusetts may have an interest in this suit, anyway.

Regarding the Pennsylvania librarian, who fulfilled some of his requests for legal materials and sent others to the department counsel fails, because the First says that doesn’t constitute transacting business.