US v. Fink, Nos. 06-1313, 06-1346. As usual, in cross-appeals of sentences the government wins and the defendant loses. This seems to be the rule in the First.
The District Court judge had ruled that Fink was subject to a ten- year statutory mandatory minimum under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B)(1999 & Supp. 2007), but that he was not eligible for career offender treatment under the United States Sentencing Guidelines (USSG), because the government had some problem providing whether prior convictions remained in force.
Fink argued that the state court convictions (for, “crimes of violence”) which he relied upon were later vacated by a different judge because there were some procedural infirmities in the change of plea hearing, which were reflected in the state court docket. But, the government seems to have figured out that the state court didn’t actually vacate the earlier convictions looking beyond the state court docket, but it didn’t have the details. The government asked for a continuance to look into the state court dockets. It was denied, because there were already a number of continuances. But, the First concludes that the government’s interest in keeping the guy in jail and spending taxpayer money to do it, outweighs the court’s interest in trying to run efficiently. But, the First does not answer many questions regarding the depth of inquiry allowed into state convictions and their vacation.
Fink also argues that 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B) is unconstitutional under the 14th because it of the federal-state disparity. But, the First does not review whether federal-state disparity makes a sentence unreasonable within the guidelines.
The court quickly disposes of an prior conviction/Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224 (1998) argument. But, it does so with class, without disparaging counsel.
An argument that the prior state convictions were part of the instant conspiracy, and therefore he could not be called a recidivist offered fails mainly on factual grounds.
Comments