US v. Garcia-Carrasquillo, Nos. 05-1684, 05-1685, 05-1686. First the sentence, then the crime the stuff about aiding and abetting. Why? Sentencing is considerably more trendy. If you are pure of heart, you can read on.
The defendant claims that his sentence was inadequately explained. The First takes this opportunity to provide at least some commentary on United States v. Jiménez-Beltre, 440 F.3d 514, 518-19 (1st Cir. 2006) (en banc) (our coverage here). The First explains just how far it will bend to infer that the District Court was thoughtful enough. The court writes:
This case exceeds those limits. The district judge gave a one-sentence explanation of her choice of sentence, which conclusorily stated that she had considered the appropriate adjustments and the [18 U.S.C.] § 3553(a) factors. She did not explain her guidelines calculation, nor did she include any reasoned analysis or reference any evidence that influenced her decision. She merely stated the sentence and paraphrased three of the seven enumerated factors, which she apparently considered important.
Likewise, the First can’t figure out what is going on by looking at the parties arguments. Even though the government says that the First could draw some inferences, saying “it is obvious that the district court chose not to apply the two recommended enhancements and that it then adopted the government's arguments for a sentence at the top of the resultant guidelines range.” the First snaps back with “even if it were true, the district court's explanation would be insufficient as a matter of law. Section 3553(c)(1) requires that the trial judge identify its reason for selecting a sentence at a particular point within a range...”
A crack-powder disparity argument is rejected under United States v. Pho, 433 F.3d 53, 54-57 (1st Cir. 2006) [(our coverage here, here,)]. But, in this case, the defendant also argues that it violates the 8th amendment. Unfortunately, the First does an superlatively crappy job of addressing this argument. It cites a bunch of cases from other circuits, including ones dealing that say that the disparity is “policy.” News flash: just because Congress made a policy doesn’t mean that it doesn’t violate the 8th amendment.
Getting to the rest of the case, it is a fairly simply drug case wherein the plaintiffs fled a house with drugs and paraphernalia in it before being arrested, and eventually convicted for possession with intent to distribute. One of the defendants admitted at a hearing before a “state” magistrate (without a written record) that the drugs were his. Regarding another defendant, who was convicted under an “aiding and abetting” theory. The defendant pointed out that even though he was with the principal and attempted to flea, a much more plausible explanation for his flight was that he was an armed fugitive. However, the First concludes that a jury could infer that there really was “aiding and abetting” and didn’t convict him for “mere presence.” Hence, the First concedes this... “there was sufficient -- albeit circumstantial and not particularly strong -- evidence that Claudio-García's presence at the scene and association with his uncle were not just ‘mere’ presence and association,...” but still affirms.
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