You love admiralty. Don't you?
Mclaughlin v. Boston Harbor Cruise Lines, No. 04-1519 holds that whether someone is a
“seaman” is fact-specific and could not be resolved by a motion to dismiss. Therefore, there is a remand, because it just wasn’t time to interpret whether the FLSA applied. The court concludes:
The Supreme Court, in a Jones Act case, has recently stated that the inquiry into whether someone is a "seaman" is bound to be a fact-intensive one: "The inquiry into seaman status is of necessity fact specific; it will depend on the nature of the vessel and the employee's precise relation to it."
Lipez concurs, and notes that the “The focus must be on the nature of the duties actually performed: whether they are maritime or non-maritime” and pointed out that the defendant’s arguments were, like, really bad.
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