Appellate Law & Practice

CA1: A lesson in 1988 attorneys fees

Torres-Rivera v. Espada-Cruz, No. 07-1806.  This is another case dealing with how to determine attorneys fees under 42 USC 1988.  The plaintiffs take this appeal because they argue that they were not awarded enough.  The First sides with the plaintiffs in large respects.  Because there are multiple litigants as well as some default judgments, the issues get complicated.

First, the First says that whatever the reason, a District Court needs to articulate its reason for awarding or not awarding fees on the record.  Second, in multi-defendant cases, the First must determine whether fees are apportionable or awarded jointly and severally.  Usually things are apportioned by time.  Sounds easy?  Well, in this case the District Court apportioned by “relative liability.”  The plaintiffs don’t like that because one defendant mounted a vigorous defense and another one defaulted. 

The First says the rule in this case is thus:

The rule that we glean from the case law runs along the following lines. Where apportionment is indicated, the choice among available options generally lies within the district court's sound discretion. ...  But when the time required to litigate against one defendant is grossly disproportionate to the time required to litigate against another defendant and the two defendants are not in privity, then the time expended method of apportionment should be used.

A global reduction of 15% “global reduction” because of vagueness of time entries.

Finally, a denial of a supplemental petition for fees for litigating the fee petition is called an abuse of discretion because the District Court didn’t give its reasons.

CA1: railroaded jailhouse lawyer can sue where he was railroaded to

Hannon v. Beard, No. 07-2272.  This is a piece of prisoner litigation.  But it is not an easy one.  Let’s see if we can lay out the figures.  Mr. Hannon (“the quintessential jailhouse lawyer”) was convicted of a crime in Pennsylvania, but was moved to Massachusetts (perhaps in retaliation for his lawyering).  In typical state-sponsored style, his legal materials “disappeared.”  In this lawsuit he sued some people in Pennsylvania (the Secretary of the Pennsylvania DOC and a librarian) as well.  Naturally, after he sued in Massachusetts, he was transferred again.  This guy does an awful lot of traveling.

Anyway, the District Court held that it didn’t have jurisdiction over the Pennsylvania defendants because, even though they sent him to Massachusetts, they didn’t transact business there.  So, it all comes down to the the Massachusetts long-arm statute, which is as wide as the constitution allows.  Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 223A, § 3(a)  (“[a] court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a person, who acts directly or by an agent, as to a cause of action in law or equity arising from the person’s transacting any business in this commonwealth.”).

The First sides with Hannon, and regarding the Secretary of Corrections, it writes:

The contacts that Beard would have had to make to arrange for Hannon’s transfer from Pennsylvania to Massachusetts are sufficient to constitute “transacting business” under the broadly-construed long-arm statute. The district court erred when it reasoned that because “[t]he decision to transfer plaintiff . . . occurred in Pennsylvania,” it lacked jurisdiction over Beard.

CA1: deputies sue sheriff under 1983 and win

Davignon v. Hodgson, No. 06-1191.  This is a 1983 action – by union corrections officers claiming that the First Amendment rights were violated – against the sheriff.  At trial, the officers won a small victory.  The sheriff appealed. 

The most interesting issue if how the First deals with an inconsistent verdict claim, as the 1983 verdict seems to have conflicted with the state law claims.  The First analyzes it and says that yes, the jury could find such a “strained” set of facts.

Strangely, the sheriff seems to have overdone the rhetoric against his officers by referring to Supreme Court cases.  But the First explains that most union speech actually is protected under the First Amendment and is, in fact, a matter of public concern.  (The First rejects the invitation to summarily accept this, and instead goes on a very long analysis concluding the same thing.)  Then it engages in a balancing of the interests at stake, and affirms the jury’s verdict.  Likewise, the First there was a “causation” case made out – in that the deputies discipline was caused by the protected activities.  Pretty much the same result is reached with regard to the “freedom of assocation” claim.

Evidentiary claims about admission of an administrative decision (used to show identity), and a reopening to present evidence of lost wages are affirmed. 

Finally, the First rejects some really strongly pro-defendant jury instructions, i.e. “Judicial review of prison officials' actions is very limited.”

CA1: Puerto Ricans’ can’t get no relief for the commonwealth’s woes

Chardon-Dubos v. US, No. 07-1966 (unpublished).  This is what was in the complaint.

...alleged that the Federal Government's failure to exercise sovereignty over Puerto Rico resulted in the Puerto Rican government choosing to spend money lobbying Congress on the issue of Puerto Rico's status, which in turn reduced government expenditures for other purposes, causing price increases and reduced services to Chardon-Dubos as a resident of Puerto Rico. 

It was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction (on a standing theory).  Affirmed

CA1: Puerto Rican political discrimination claim fails

Morales-Tanon v. PR Electric Power Authority, No. 07-1774 affirms a dismissal in a Puerto Rican political discrimination case. There were two issues: when the statutes of limitations began to run (i.e. when a shift in office-holders became clear); and whether opening a failure to open a search is cognizable.  The First says that it isn’t.

I sort of like this line “Morales-Tañon, an attorney, has held a career position as a member of PREPA's Auction Committee since 1997. The complaint gives no information about what the Auction Committee does.”

CA1: Getting an evidentiary hearing in a service fight

Blair v. Towler, Nos. 06-1626, 07-1258.  This started as a fairly standard “cops beating the crap out of someone case.” “In an initial action, after the petitioners filed an amended complaint, the district court granted the defendants' motions to dismiss, without prejudice, for failure to perfect service of process.”  They appealed that, and requested a stay while they tried again.  Then they refiled and re-served.  “Ah ha!”  The defendants say, the action is time-barred.  The District Court also denied discovery on the issue of service and an evidentiary hearing, saying that they were “grasping at straws.”

So, both appeals are consolidated.  I bet you want to know what happens.  If you really do, you should click on the link that appears below this text. Thank you.

CA1: 1983 state action failures are not a matter of subject matter jurisdiction

Alberto San, Inc. v. Consejo de Titulares, No. 07-1605.  While this case involves an office condo, the complaint included 1983 claims as well as claims that various statutes were unconstitutional.  The District Court dismissed for lack of “subject matter jurisdiction.”

The First says this isn’t the way to do it.  The First says that a 1983 claim that is dismissed for a lack of a state actor is a merits issue.  However, the First says that the 1983 claim fails because they didn’t actually state a claim in the complaint.  (This case provides a good guide to how to plead 1983 actions where there is not “direct” state actions.)

On the other hand, the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201 doesn’t help, because it requires a some other theory upon which the defendants could prevail.  However, the court reverses the grant of attorneys fees.

CA1: dismissal for want of prosecution affirmed

Gulla v. Dennehy, No. 07-1936 (unpublished).  Case was dismissed for want of prosecution after District Court gave a prisoner a few changes to amend his complaint.  The plaintiff claims that he was “incapacitated” during the time period in question, the First does not buy it.  I wonder why they said they “carefully” considered the arguments made, when there is no indication that they even addressed his arguments point by point. 

CA1: Farmers’ due process claims fail

Perez-Acevedo v. Rivero-Cubano, No. 06-2633.  This is a corporate 1983 action by some Puerto Rican poultry farmer.  In Puerto Rico, the commonwealth allowed farmers to join a “nucleus” which allowed them to use a trademark.  Nucleus membership conferred other benefits such as loan guarantees and tax credits.  But, some farmers didn’t want to join, thinking they could do their own promotion.  The case was dismissed on a judgment on the pleadings. 

Regarding the procedural due process argument (that the District Court strangely did not address), the First says that 1) one property right doesn’t actually involve farmers; and 2) the other one (dealing with financial assistance) wasn’t property briefed, and even if it was they didn’t really claim that Peurto Rico failed to follow its own APA.

CA1: ah, the great pro se lawsuit

Swan v. Barbadoro, No. 07-1453.  Guy was convicted of some tax stuff.  Then he sues the judges and prosecutors under Bivens.  Then he sues under RICO.  You know where this is going (or went).  In the First he moves for everyone in the First to recuse themselves.  So, the First has to explain how Heck bars further litigation impugning the underlying convictions.