CA1: moody teens, ERISA, and shortening the limitations period

Island View Residential Treatment Center et al v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Massachusetts, 08-1287.  Okay, before I begin, I gotta get something off my chest: I am sorry for what I said about the people that are both partners at large firms at furries.  Even though my words might have been taken that way, I didn’t mean to imply that there is an inherent incompatibility between being “Really Yiffy” and being a “managing partner.”  Really.  If dressing up like a sexy fox helps with business development, who am I to second-guess you?  So, stop emailing me!  And stop emailing me pictures of you dressed up like a chimpmunk from your work account! Maybe ATL cares more than I do.

Sorry, where was I?  Furries.. Oh yes.  Moody teens and insurance.  That is all the First Circuit cares about these days.

Anyway, a moody teen (or as the adults say “substance abuse and self-mutilation”) was admitted to a bunch of places.  She was so moody that she ran away to join a large law firm.  Then she was recaptured and they medicated the hell out of her.  In Utah.   When the “treatment facility” demanded payment for medicating the hell out of the moody teen, Blue Cross said that no, because the hell did not need to be medicated out of this particular moody teen.  Eventually they said they could pay for part of the medication.  Ever reviewer (and agency) agreed with Blue Cross.

Then the Moody Teen’s mother brought suit under ERISA.  But, this comes down to a statute of limitations issue, and for these purposes ERISA doesn’t have its own statute of limitations.  The question therefore is whether the Utah or Massachusetts statute of limitations applies. 

The First says that the contractual language, which appears to shorten the statute of limitations, is confusing, but ultimately does manage to shorten the statute of limitations via a contractual time limit.  The First then goes on to say that since contractual time limits on suits are different than statutes of limitations, that tolling for minority is inapplicable.

Finally, the First says that it wasn’t an abuse of discretion in transferring the case from Utah to Massachusetts.