CA1: transporting a minor is a crime of violence even post Begay

US v. Williams, No. 07-1354 holds that interstate transport of a minor for prostitution in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2423(a) is a “crime of violence” within the purview of the career offender provision of the federal sentencing guidelines, i.e. USSG §4B1.2(a).  Why?  The guideline defines “crime of violence” as “otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another.”  Sure, Selya says, there wasn’t any force, but this is a “residual provision.” But, the analysis is fairly straight-forward (even if it ignores the fact that there are several other actors besides the defendant involved in subjecting the “victim” to harm).

Read on...

In our view, the fact that the appellant was not personally intimate with the minor during the commission of any of the section 2423(a) offenses does nothing to diminish the risk that force might be used in carrying out the crime. The appellant's conduct — knowingly transporting the minor for prostitution — necessarily placed the minor in harm's way and led ineluctably to a sex act that typically occurred in close quarters between the minor and an older man unconcerned with her welfare. Thus, the imbalanced power dynamic that influenced our earlier decisions was fully operational here. So were the twin likelihoods that force might be used and that serious physical harm might result....

And, finally, exposing a young girl to multiple sex partners obviously adds incrementally to the potential risk of disease. Taking these realities into account, we have no hesitancy in concluding that the appellant's conduct actually increased the level of risk.

Selya then rejects the idea that the defendant only intended a “joint business venture” with someone over 18. 

Finally, Selya engages in a Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. ___ (2008) analysis, and holds that these crimes are much worse than DUI and the crime was really aggressive, and intentionally so.