CA1: hotel room bust okay

US v. Jones, No. 06-2472.  This case begins with a long narrative of a drug bust with a no-knock warrant.  Then the First gets into Fourth Amendment issues, and therefore we can guess we where those are going.

To answer the black-letter-law question that everyone seems to get wrong “Renters of hotel rooms generally benefit from the same Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures as they would if they were at home.”  Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483, 486-87 (1964).  It even goes so far as to say that if the hotel gives the cops the key, it doesn’t mean that the renter so consents.

There is more post where that came from.  Read on.

But, with those great principles in place, the First begins to knock they down.  First it says that Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 594 (2006) doesn’t require exclusion (even though the District Court’s decision predates Hudson).  The First, however finds since the cops had an “objectively reasonable” belief that the defendant (with some violent tenancies) was in the room, it’s all good.  But, the First seems to go even further and says “ Even if they violated the Fourth Amendment by failing to knock and announce their presence before going in, the motion to suppress was not the appropriate vehicle for Jones to obtain the remedy he seeks.”  Of course, because the First is dealing with poor people it doesn’t discuss what his possible remedies might be.  I can only assume that they are referring to a 1983 lawsuit against the cops.

As to a search of the hotel room, which was conducted with the “consent” of the defendant (by “consent” we don’t mean informed consent – we mean “consent” way that someone in handcuffs can “asked” to consent).  The District Court bends to explain how consent by the lower classes in such situations is acceptable, and the First bends, too.  And, of course, by “consent” he obviously consented to a search of whatever the agents searched.  Why do I think the District Court was bending?  It also found that a search of a cabinet was justified under the “protective sweep” doctrine.

Going to sentencing, the First says it wasn’t outrageous for a defendant to be held responsible for over 4,000 kilograms of cocaine.  The First brushes this off by saying that the PSR was generally “plausible.”  Finally, a two-level increase for a leadership role is affirmed.

Appellate Review comments here.