CA1: even state entities can’t file motions (and appeal them) late

Torres v. Commonwealth of PR, No. 06-1771.  A girl claims to have been sexually harassed at a high school that receives federal funds.  The plaintiff and her parents sue under Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972. See 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1688 and 42 U.S.C. § 1983.  The school moves to dismiss and for summary judgment.  The District Court rules against their qualified immunity and eleventh amendment defenses.  So, the government takes a first  interlocutory appeal. Not only does the government lose, but their request for a stay of the proceedings in the District Court is denied, and the government is sanctioned by the District Court for delaying proceedings.  Nevertheless, the proceedings are delayed, and delayed again.  The defendants again tried to have it dismissed, this time under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c) (motion for judgment on the pleadings).  That was denied because "that the deadline for the filing of dispositive motions ha[d] long passed."  So the defendants appealed again.  You are to keep reading below the fold.

The First looks at the order, and considers whether a decision to deny it on timing grounds really makes it just a case-management order which isn’t appealable, or whether it really was a dispositive resolution of the qualified immunity, that is appealable. The First points out that the answer to this question alters the standard of review. Selya uses a lot of big words because he is worried that people won’t think that he is smart. 

The First decides that it is a case-management order, and as such it should hesitate to interfere with a reasonable sanction for violating the pre-trial order and filing a dispositive motion really late. Therefore, because the underlying issue was qualified immunity – which must be raised as a defense, the defendants lose their ability to assert it before the judge. Or, in the words of the court:

Although state entities and public officials enjoy special protection from the vagaries of civil litigation, this protection is not unlimited. Because immunity defenses may be raised at several different stages of a case, the potential for abuse is substantial. For that reason, the right to assert an immunity defense must be balanced with the district court's obligation to ensure the "just, speedy, and inexpensive" resolution of cases.

The court concludes by explaining how the District Court judge was just doing what was reasonable.