Professional responsibility and rules of decision

Some of the legal ethics blogs have been talking about Matzkin v. Delaney, Zemetis, Donahue, Durham & Noonan, 2005 WL 2009277 (Conn. Super. Ct. July 29, 2005) in which Judge Lopez held that a suit against a law firm that allegedly fired an lawyer that wanted to file a grievances against another law (as required by Connecticut’s rules of professional conduct). (See, e.g., New York Lawyer; Connecticut Law Tribune; ). Judge Lopez held that:

Because the legal profession is self-regulated and relies upon its members to police itself, no lawyer's employment should be conditioned upon turning a blind eye to violations of the Rules which are applicable to all lawyers. To allow this would compromise the autonomy of the profession. Therefore, this court finds that the plaintiff has sufficiently alleged that the Rules of Professional Conduct are an important public policy.

 While the opinion doesn’t seem to be on a public website yet, and, of course, it is from the Connecticut Trial Court, it is worth noting that the judge replied on a decision from the New York Court of appeals, Wieder v. Skala, 80 N.Y.2d 628, 593 N.Y.S.2d 752, 609 N.E.2d 105 (1992):

in any hiring of an attorney as an associate to practice law with a firm there is implied an understanding so fundamental to the relationship and essential to its purpose as to require no expression: that both the associate and the firm in conducting the practice will do so in accordance with the ethical standards of the profession. Erecting or countenancing disincentives to compliance with the applicable rules of professional conduct, plaintiff contends, would subvert the central professional purpose of his relationship with the firm -- the lawful and ethical practice of law.

Since the question of where the line between legal ethics and substantive law has always interested me, I should probably note that Wieder v. Skala doesn’t quite address whether a rule of professional responsibility could be asserted by a third-party, or rather the only prively-enforceable rights they create are in the context of a contracts between employer and employee.