CA 11 today (2/11)

Two cases from the 11th so far today, one about bankruptcy and fraudulent transfers, and one criminal case touching briefly but perhaps importantly on Booker among other issues. By the way, you surely don't want an appellate judge to write about you, as the judge wrote in the bankruptcy case, "Although the briefs submitted here are not very informative about either the relevant facts or the precise issues ..." More below:

Reily v. Kapila starts off with a quote from Plato that may have something metaphorically to do with fraudulent transfers, and gets more obscure from there. Here is what the Court says the case is about, and you may understand it better than I:

The bankruptcy claim presented here, brought by a Chapter 7 bankruptcy trustee, seeks avoidance of a $100,000 payment to a shareholder in the debtor corporations pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 548. The potential recovery of that payment under 11 U.S.C. § 550(a)(1) requires us to assess whether providing the unquantifiable key to a larger transaction can qualify a party as an “entity for whose benefit” a putatively voidable transfer is made. 11 U.S.C. § 550(a)(1) (2004). We believe that, under the circumstances presented here, “benefit” has been too broadly defined to meet the requirements of 11 U.S.C. § 550(a)(1).

US v. Frye is the criminal case, and it involves 4 issues, arising out of a guilty plea to charges of conspiracy-to-manufacture-meth and firearms offenses. (1) Was the guilty plea knowing and voluntary? Yes, despite some vaguely-described problems in the relationship between Frye and his counsel. (2) Can a defendant be convicted of a firearms charge if he has not been convicted of the underlying predicate offense? The question arises because he was charged with carrying firearms in connection with certain drug offenses that were different from the one he pleaded guilty to. The answer, says the Court as a matter of first impression in the Circuit, is "no problem" -- only the fact of the underlying crime, not a conviction of it, is required, and apparently other Circuits agree. (3) Was there a sufficient factual basis for the guilty pleas on the firearms counts? Yes -- he had the guns on him during his drug crimes, in a nutshell. (4) Was there a Sixth Amendment violation due to the enhancements for "leading role" and "risk to human life or the environment" for the meth-manufacturing charge? The Court again says "no problem," because defendant admitted facts from which (says the Circuit) the trial court could have found the basis for those enhancements. To some eyes, including mine, this part of the opinion will seem to be a stretch -- it can be viewed as allowing a judge to make findings of fact that extrapolate on things that the defendant admitted, rather than limiting the judge to the particular facts that defendant admitted. He didn't admit, for instance, that the meth-operation created any danger to life or environment; he admitted that protective gear was required to clear a meth lab, but that isn't quite the same thing, is it?

Comments

[AnonClerk]

In theory, I think you raise a good point about judges extrapolating, but if you go to the Sixth Circuit case cited, you'll see the court's conclusion as to "risk to human life or environment" was not based solely on the defendant's admission that protection gear was required. A quick summary - the sentencing guidelines tell a court considering risk to consider, among other things, (1) type of drug (2) quantity produced (3) location of production and (4) the manner in which they were disposed. Here the defendant admitted he cooked (1) cyrstal meth (2) a lot of it (3) in several residential neighborhoods and (4) did so in a way that required protective gear to dispose of it. Yes, teh court probably could have been more explicit, but I think they're on sound footing. Sorry for the long post. Cheers.

[Sam Heldman]

Thanks for the comments. I admit that I'm shooting from the hip since I haven't ever really researched this particular aspect of Apprendi/Blakeley, but it still seems to me that even with all those things admitted, the finding of risk to life or environment is still a separate fact that a finder might or might not find based on those sub-facts. Maybe I'm wrong -- been wrong before! Anyway, haggling about Blakeley issues of this sort is so 2004. The odd thing, as Prof. Berman pointed out, is that the panel here didn't even do a Booker/Fanfan analysis.

[AnonClerk]

I see what your saying. But is it a fact, or is it an conclusion? Now I'm shooting from the hip, but I think of application of law to fact scenarios. If the court finds facts x, y, and z, it can lead to a legal conclusion that he consented. Whether he consented isn't a factual finding. I don't know, it's Friday and time to go. Just discovered this blog recently, keep up the good work.